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Abstract
Background: In 1995, teaching and public hospitals that are affiliated with the ministry of health and medical
education (MOHME) in Iran were granted financial self-sufficiency to practice contract-based relations with
insurance organizations. The so-called “hospital autonomy” policy involved giving authority to the insurance
organizations to purchase health services. The policy aimed at improving hospitals’ performance, hoping to reduce
government’s costs. However, the policy was never implemented as intended. This was because most participating
hospitals gave up to implement autonomous financing and took other financing pathways. This paper analyses the
reasons for the gap between the intended policy and its execution. The lessons learned from this analysis can
inform, we envisage, the implementation of similar initiatives in other settings.
Methods: We conducted semi-structured interviews with 28 national and 13 regional health policy experts. We also
gathered a comprehensive and purposeful set of related documents and analyzed their content. The qualitative
data were analyzed by thematic inductive-deductive approach.
Results: We found a number of prerequisites and requirements that were not prepared prior to the implementing
hospital autonomy policy and categorized them into policy content (sources of funds for the policy),
implementation context (organization of insurance organizations, medical tariffs, hospitals’ organization, feasibility of
policy implementation, actors and stakeholders’ support), and implementation approach (implementation method,
blanket approach to the implementation and timing of implementation). These characteristics resulted in unsuitable
platform for policy implementation and eventually led to policy failure.
Conclusions: Autonomy of teaching hospitals and their exclusive financing through insurance organizations did
not achieve the desired goals of purchaser-provider split in Iran. Unless contextual preparations are in place,
hospital autonomy will not succeed and problematic financial relations between service providers and patients in
autonomous hospitals may not be ceased as a result.
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Background
Policymaking is an ongoing and dynamic process. Policies
are usually subject to change, particularly in response to
problems arising from their implementation [1]. Imple-
menting a policy does not necessarily result in achieving
the policy objectives [2]. Therefore, observing a gap
between what policymakers intended and what they
achieved is usual [3].
In the early 1990s, polices such as purchaser-provider
split (PPS), internal competition, cost recovery and free-
dom of choice were introduced to focus on the demand
(purchasing) side of the health systems [4, 5]. The main
aim of such decentralizing policies was to reduce the role
of the state; [6] divest itself of primary organizational
responsibilities, and create independent sectors for service
provision and financial responsibilities [7, 8].
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Purchaser-provider split in healthcare was inspired by
New Public Management approach to government [9, 10]
based on principal-agent separation and contractual rela-
tionship between the purchaser (principal) and provider
(agent) [11, 12]. Three levels of relationship are necessary
for successful implementation of PPS: relationship with
the public, with the provider and with the financiers who
are responsible for distributing resources to the purchaser
[9]. Failure in any of these links may overshadow the
actual philosophy of PPS.
PPS may involve a “quasi” or “internal” market
model, which seeks greater decentralization through
creation of autonomous agencies to supply (provision)
services [13, 14]. In the health system, separating
‘purchaser’ from ‘provider’ aims to increase the finan-
cial and managerial autonomy of hospitals and other
providing organizations, and grant them greater au-
thority to provide higher quality health care services
[15]. This may lead to greater efficiency, extended
users’ choice on the basis on needs-led services, and
improved accountability of service providers [16–19].
There are a number of PPS experiences worldwide. In
Sweden, PPS was primarily used to foster competition
within the public sector and shift political control [20].
Australia [21], the National Health Service in the United
Kingdom [22], New Zealand [23], and the United States
of America are among countries that have implemented
the PPS in their primary and hospital healthcare settings
[18]. The first national attemmpt to implement PPS in
primary health care in Iran during the implementation
of family physicial program did not succeed in changing
the status quo, became a reason for fighting, misunder-
standing, lack of co-operation and failure of the fragile
partnership between the purchaser and provider [24]. To
date and after more than two decades of implementation
in various settings, evidence shows that despite some
modest benefits (improving public administration [25]
and improving incentives for efficient production and
service delivery [26], purchaser-provider split, has not
sufficiently endured or fostered long term systematic
changes [8] or greater efficiency in health care [27, 28].
The Implementation of Purchaser-Provider split (PPS) in
Iran
Until 1994, the main financing source for public hospitals
(including teaching hospitals) in Iran was government-
allocated public funds [29]. The ministry of health and
medical education (MOHME) was the sole employer of
healthcare providers, owned healthcare facilities, and pur-
chased the services that were provided in public hospitals.
Table 1 summarizes General information of Iranian health
system in 1994 and 2013 Table 2.
In November 1994, parliament approved the Medical
Services Insurance (MSI (Act, implementing which was
considered as a turning point for many significant changes
within the Iranian health system. As advocated by the
MSI Act, the Medical Services Insurance Organization
(MSIO) was created in 1994 to provide universal health
insurance for all citizens. With the aim of cutting financial
relations between medical providers and patients in hospi-
tals, the MSI Act’s mandate was splitting purchaser
(MSIO) from provider (MOHME). The policy enforced
the government to begin the implementation of universal
medical insurance during the next five years times period.
The MSIO was regulated by the Insurance High Council,
one of whose duties was setting the medical tariffs as well
as insurance premiums [30]. In 1995, the Parliament
passed a bill enforcing public hospitals to fund themselves
through revenue-generating fees (fee-for-services pay-
ment). Such a decision was also known as hospital auton-
omy policy [31]. During 1990–1993 and right before the
time that the policy implementation started, average bed
occupancy rate at public hospitals in Iran was about 56 %.
The figure meant that over 16000 beds at the public
hospital included in the study remained relatively unused
[32]. Also the finding of performance assessment of 255
non-teaching hospitals (covering 30200 beds) that were
affiliated with MOHME, brought a number of challenges
with regard to performance and efficiency of such hospi-
tals to the attention of policy makers [33].
Table 1 General information of Iranian health system
(1994 and 2013)abc(Iran Parliament research Center, 1994)
1994 2013
Population 60,055,000 76, 921, 859
Total expenditure on
health of GDP
7 % 5.6 %
Hospital bed index 1.5 beds per
1000 people
1.4 beds per
1000 people
Medical Insurance Coverage 40 % 83 %
Physician population 40266 137639
aSource: I.R. Iran,2013, http://www.amar.org.ir/default.aspx
bSource: I.R. Iran, MOHME, 2012. http://www.pooyasamaneh.net
chttp://www.behdasht.gov.ir/2013
Table 2 Typology of Iranian Hospitals according to their
ownershipa
Hospital affiliated to: Hospitals Hospital beds Hospital beds (%)
MOHME 554 75569 67.8
Social security organization 70 9893 8.7
Armed forces and veterans 53 5005 4.4
Charities 30 3162 2.8
Other public hospitals 36 3034 2.7
Private 144 13076 11.5
Others 13 2424 2.1
Total 900 111363 100
a Source: I.R. Iran, MOHME, 2012. http://www.pooyasamaneh.net
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The autonomous policy took away public hospitals’ fund-
ing from the MOHME’s public budget and replaced it with
households’ co-payments as well as fee-for-service payment
from the MSIO, so-called “Special Revenue Funds” [34].
The MSI Act stated that the MSIO must receive per capita
premiums from annual governmental budget, and in return
provide certain packages of hospital-based health services
for citizens. By creating contractual-based relationships
between the MSIO and public hospitals, the autonomy
policy aimed to foster competition among hospitals;
improve the quality of service delivery; increase efficiency,
quality of health services and patients satisfaction [33], and
as a result improve hospitals’ performance. Despite initial
thoughts to implement the financial autonomy policy by
approving MSI Act, the implementation of the policy did
not meet the intention of its designers. To remedy the
unexpected effects of policy implementation, parliament
approved another policy in 1996, so-called the budget
amendment plan of 30303. The new policy mandated the
government to finance the salary of hospitals’ staff within
medical universities annual budget, remunerated via public
funds. This led public hospitals to enjoy three sources of
funding:(1) the universities of medical sciences’ annual
budget; (2) fee for services paid by medical insurance orga-
nizations; and (3) people’s out of pocket payment for
services that were not covered by the MSIO. Plan 30303
ceased financial autonomy of hospitals.
This paper aims to answer two main questions:
1. Why the proposed hospital autonomy policy did not
lead to purchaser-provider split in public hospitals in
Iran?
2. What were the reasons for diversion of hospital
autonomy policy from its intended routes?
In Iran, public health services are provided at three
levels. At primary care level, Iran has a well-structured
primary health care (PHC) network. Local health
workers called Behvarzes are at the heart of basic
healthcare services provision in rural Iran [35]. In the
course of last decade, PHC has been strengthening
through the implementation of family physician pro-
gram in rural areas and cities of less than 20,000 popu-
lations [36]. Secondary and tertiary healthcare services
in Iran are provided in hospitals, many of which are
affiliated to the MOHME. The private sector mainly
focuses on secondary and tertiary healthcare in urban
areas [37]. There are 217 teaching hospitals in Iran.
68 % of beds in Iran’s public hospitals belong to 44
medical universities across the country, which are regu-
lated by the MOHME.
Most health services in the Iranian public hospitals are
purchased by various insurance organizations. These orga-
nizations provide universal or national health insurance,
which is paid through a defined capitation premium, paid
to them by the government.
The MSIO (currently called Health Insurance
Organization: HIO) is considered the largest health insur-
ance organization in Iran. In 2012, MSIO covered 36
million people (government employees, self-employed,
rural inhabitants, etc.) [38]. Private insurance companies
have a very small and negligible share in provision of basic
health insurance in Iran. The private sector is convention-
ally prominent in providing complementary medical in-
surances in Iran.
Methods
Design and setting
This is a retrospective policy analysis using qualitative
methods. We collected data (interviews and different
types of documents) at national and regional levels of
health system in Iran, from December 2012 until March
2013 and in two sequential phases.
Sampling and data collection
We used purposeful and snowball sampling techniques
to identify 42 interviewees. The interviewees were health
system experts from across various capacities and posi-
tions: policy makers, hospital mangers and other key
informants. The interviewees were included based on
their accessibility, willingness to participate and provide
information for this study, and diversity. Table 3 summa-
rizes the characteristics of interviewees.
We used a reflexive interview guide (Appendix),
which started from general questions and gradually
moved to more specific questions. All interviews were
undertaken at the interviewees’ working place. Inter-
views lasted between 48 and 142 min, were recorded
and transcribed verbatim. In occasions that the inter-
viewees paused because they were unable to remember
particular policy events, we used exploratory questions
to prompt responses.
In addition, we purposefully collected relevant
documents of various types, from 1992 (before the
approval of the MSI Act) to 1997 (one year after the
approval of plan 30303) and analyzed their content.
Table 4 shows the list of documents, gathered and
analyzed in this study. Some documents were leading
sources to other documents.
Data analysis
We used principles of content analysis (deductive-in-
ductive) [39–41] as to analyze documentary data and
merged this with data emerged from interviews. We
started analysis by a preliminary thematic framework.
Two authors (LD and AR) read all documents and tran-
scripts several to extract relevant issues, themes and sub-
themes. We continued this process until we developed a
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satisfactory thematic framework. The MAXQDA 10 soft-
ware1 was used for the ease and more appropriate man-
agement of data set.
Ethical considerations
Study objectives were clearly explained to all inter-
viewees in advance and their oral consent was obtained
to record interviews, and take notes from conversations
should we stopped recording upon interviewees’ request.
We ensured anonymity and observed data confidentiality
with great care. The study participants provided consent
to publish the participant identifiers. This research was
approved by the Ethics Committee of the Iran University
of Medical Sciences (Medical Ethics No: 92/n/105/2322).
Results
We present our findings under three main themes: “pol-
icy content”, “implementation context”, and “implemen-
tation approach”. There are also nine subthemes and 33
issues, which are summarized in Table 5.
Policy content refers to sources of funds for the policy
development. “Implementation context“ refers to the
contextual issues and planned steps for the policy devel-
opment. “Implementation approach” refers to the issues
that arose as a result of implementing the policy.
The policy content
Hospital autonomy policy was implemented because
of its perceived potential benefits to increase hospi-
tals’ efficiency, and improve hospitals’ financial system
[hospitals modern System Plan (Nezame Novin in
Farsi)]. This intention of policy makers failed in real-
ity. Meanwhile, despite the policy’s desire, the share
of out of pocket (OOP) expenditures in financing of
public hospitals went significantly up in Iran. We
Table 4 List of documents, number and the sources of documents
Documents Time period Sources No
Parliamentary proceedings 1991–1996 Parliament Libraries 43
Plans(fee-for-service Plan, 30303 Plan, hospitals modern System
Plan (Novin Nezam in Farsi)
1992–1996 Parliament Libraries/Ministry of Health 3
the Five-Year Development Plans of Iran
(the second, the Third, the Fourth and the Fifth)
1996–2000/2001–
2006/2006–2011/
2011- 2015
Parliament Libraries 4
the Iranian National Health Insurance proposal the Iranian National
Health Insurance Act the Iranian National Health Insurance Bill
1989, 1992, 1994 Vice-Presidency for Strategic Planning and
Supervision libraries
3
hospitals Administration regulations/bylaw 1979, 1994, 1995,
2007
MOHME 5
The budget Acts (1989–1996), 2007 Islamic Consultative assembly research Center 8
Policy reports 1989–2010 Universities Libraries, Vice-Presidency for Strategic
Planning and Supervision libraries, Parliament library
9
Policy articles/Text clippings 1991–2009 Vice-Presidency for Strategic Planning and
Supervision libraries/Parliament library/local journals
29
Totals 104
Table 3 The interviewees’ positions and distribution
Organization Position No
Ministry of health and
Medical Organization
(MOHME)
former Ministers of Health 4
Advisor to minister 2
Senior officers in
medical tariff unit
2
Senior policy officials in
health policy making council
1
Senior officials in Budget office 4
Iran’s Parliament The Members of the
2nd, 3 rd, 4th Parliament
3
Former senior national officials 2
Former Senior policy officials in
health Commission of Parliament
2
Insurance Organizations Member of the Managing
Board in Medical Services
Insurance Organization
2
Academic, Senior Policy
Maker of the Iranian
Health System
3
Hospitals Hospital managers 3
Head of financial affairs
of hospitals
2
Universities of
Medical sciences
Head of financial affairs
of University
2
University teachers 2
Vice-Presidency for Strategic
Planning and Supervision
(Former budgeting and
Planning Organization)
Former Senior Policy officers 2
Former Head of organization 1
Medical Council Senior Policy officials 2
Health policy research centers Health policy researchers
and public policy researchers
3
Total 41
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present the reasons for such unintended consequences
below.
Sources of funds for the policy implementation
Inadequate funding had severe adverse effects on the pol-
icy implementation. Two main sources of funds were
available for hospitals’ autonomy: government’s contribu-
tion, paid as capitation payment to insurance companies,
plus users’ co-payments. As stated in analyzed documents,
many interviewees also pointed out that low capitation
payments weakened the insurance market and hindered
the implementation of the policy:
“The Government was supposed to pay a lump sum
from public funds to the newly established MSIO.
However, the expenditure per capita was
underestimated and did not correspond to the
increasing costs of hospitals. This was a barrier to
Table 5 The thematic framework explaining the themes, sub-themes and issues that represented the influential factors that
influenced the development and implementation of hospital autonomy policy in Iran
Theme Subthemes Issues
Policy content Sources of funds for the policy -Capitation payment as employer contribution to government
- Financial contribution of insured people
- Government financial support
- out of pocket health expenditure
Implementation
context
Organization of insurance
organizations
- An inexperienced insurance organization (MSIO)
- Inadequate insurance fund
- Inadequate health insurance coverage
(population covered and depth of coverage)
- delayed hospitals’ reimbursement
Medical tariffs -Technical aspects of setting medical tariffs
- Delays in adjusting tariffs by general inflation
- Stewardship and policy making in setting tariffs
Organization of hospitals - costs and revenues information system
- teaching nature of target hospitals
- imbalances in different aspects of autonomy
(relative autonomy in generating revenues while no autonomy in staff management)
- asymmetry of information between hospitals and insurance organizations
- hospitals administration requirements
Implementation feasibility -lack of pilot study
- no formal assessment of research evidence on autonomy implementation
- no feasibility assessment
Actors and stakeholders support -lack of cooperation and coordination among various stakeholders
- inadequate/ignorance of legal framework
- cultural issues in hospitals
- the interpretation of the policy
Implementation
Approach
Implementation method - top- down approach
- expanding hospital autonomy before establishing its financing source
(i.e., an effective universal health insurance organization)
Blanket approach
(‘one size fits all’ approach)
-Hospital Catchment Areas
- Hospitals’ patients’ turnover
-resources distribution among hospitals
Timing of implementation - difficult economic conditions (high national inflation rate)
- hasty implementation
- hospitals’ internal strategy for the implementation
- optimistic time frames for policy success (expecting too much too soon)
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the implementation of fee-for-service policy.”
(Former minister of health).
Inadequate capitation payment, especially in the first
years of the implementation of hospitals’ autonomy,
pushed hospitals toward demanding greater copayments,
which led to rapid increase of OOP. In other words, al-
though public financial contribution should have been
confined to premiums, “autonomy policy forced hospitals
to charge patients to compensate their monetary short-
ages” [the Iranian National Health Insurance proposal],
as illustrated by a senior officer from the former Budget-
ing and Planning Organization:
“The Medical Services Insurance Act does not allow
hospitals to receive money from people; it stipulates
that people must pay insurance premiums, the
government must finance insurance organizations, and
insurance organizations must cover the costs of
hospitals.”
The policy highlighted the government’s contribution
as a substantial proportion of funding for autonomous
hospitals. However, this was never fully realized:
“There was never sufficient financial support from the
government (to run hospitals). Perhaps it would have
been much easier to pursue the policy, if the
government allocated a designated budget for
implementing this particular policy.” (National policy
maker)
“In 1995, 95 % of public hospitals’ income was from
government’s contribution. The country’s current
budget anticipates that 50 % of hospitals’ revenue
must be generated from people co-payments and insur-
ance organizations, which is not a realistic expect-
ation.” (Former minister of health)
The implementation context
Our study demonstrated that inappropriate preparation
was the leading cause for the pitfalls in the implementa-
tion of public hospitals’ autonomy policy in Iran. The
implementation context, i.e., lack of infrastructures and
other essential factors led to the PPS policy to fail. This
is why the paper’s title is “you can prepare to fail”. Five
subthemes were identified with regards to the imple-
mentation context: organization of insurance organiza-
tions, Medical tariffs, organization of hospitals, actors
and stakeholders’ support, and the feasibility of imple-
mentation, as described below.
The organization of insurance organizations
Due to organizational weaknesses, the insurance industry
could not generate sufficient revenue to fund autonomous
hospitals. In addition, inadequate and delayed funds in the
first years of MSIO establishment weakened this insurance
organization:
“The universal medical services insurance covered
employees, rural residents, and self-employed and
vulnerable individuals. To avoid any social tension,
the policy allowed other people to get insurance with
a low premium, once they admitted into a hospital!
Although this was a valuable action to protect citizens,
it was against principles and nature of insurance
market, which is calculated on the basis of insurance
premium and real medical tariffs. As a result, the
government’s debt to insurance organizations
increased, which adversely affected their financial
ability”. (Former senior policy officer).
Moreover, involved insurance organizations were
not prepared enough for the implementation of the
new policy, i.e., no proper mechanism was in place
for hospitals’ reimbursements by insurances bodies:
“The mere approval of the Universal health Insurance
[MSI] Act did not lead to consistent insurance system,
where the role of third party is fundamental. This
policy is good in theory, but it is problematic in
practice. What happened in reality was
semi-autonomous administration of hospitals, as the
government accepted to pay most expenses of
hospitals.” (Health policy researcher)
Despite the initial plans, universal medical services
insurance was never implemented completely across the
country. Instead, the implementation of hospital auton-
omy policy pushed public hospitals toward inappropriate
revenue-generating methods, mainly OOP:
“MSI Act was partially implemented and it did not
cover all people, by implementing hospital autonomy
policy, hospitals had to rely on out-of-pocket payments
for their survival, and this was the main factor for
increasing OOP payments” (Advisor to the minister of
health).
Medical tariffs
The MSI Act emphasized appropriate mechanisms to
determine realistic tariffs for medical services, i.e., diag-
nostic and therapeutic services, taking into account the
inflation rate and annual capitation. This did not happen
in practice, which adversely affected day-to-day expend-
iture and total revenue of hospitals:
“Wrong pricing system is one of the main reasons for
unrealistic medical tariffs in Iran. The relative value
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of medical services is not accurately determined and
most internal and external stakeholders are not
accounted for calculating costs. There seemed to be a
bias in pricing.” (Senior medical tariff official).
The implementation of MSI Act policy undermined
the authority of the MOHME in determining tariffs of
medical services:
“The ministry of health and Medical Education has few
votes in the High Council of Medical Insurance. The
MOHME ought to conduct strong lobbying to get money
from insurance companies, and then distribute it among
universities and hospitals.” (Medical tariff ’s officer).
Organization of target hospitals
The main context for implementing hospital autonomy
policy was teaching hospitals. Many interviewees
thought that the policy was inconsistent with the mis-
sions and goals of these types of hospitals. This was be-
cause such hospitals had to cover essential teaching and
research costs, whereas the insurance organizations felt
little responsibility to cover such expenditure.
“The costs of rare and complex surgeries were
extortionate for teaching hospitals. On the one hand,
the hospitals must provide such services for teaching
purposes. On the other hand, simpler and more
profitable operations may be more desirable. We must
admit that teaching hospitals were the wrong
environment for the implementation of autonomy
policy, which eventually lowered their scientific and
educational merit.” (Former minister of health).
Lack of proper accounting system in hospitals contrib-
uted to their delayed reimbursement by insurance orga-
nizations. In addition, information asymmetries between
hospitals and insurance bodies led to problematic con-
tracts for fee for service payments. Worse still, the pub-
lic nature of hospitals reduced their competitiveness:
“Prior to the implementation of MSI Act in 1995,
the Ministry of Health’s income from hospitals was
expected to be similar to the Ministry of
Communication … It is wrong and illogical to
compare communications with human lives”
(Former senior health policy maker).
In addition, the participating hospitals were granted
incomplete and imbalanced autonomous power. The
policy mostly focused on fiscal aspects of purchaser-
provider split at the price of overlooking other crucial
dimensions including Human resource capacity within
target hospitals:
“Most of our hospital managers were not educated in
hospital management, health economics or other
relevant disciplines. They are unable therefore to plan,
manage costs, and oversee their organizations
appropriately” (Senior health officer).
Actors and Stakeholders’ support
Our findings endorsed the crucial role of various stake-
holders, especially from the government, and their
support in achieving the policy goals. Overall, heterogen-
eity and lack of harmony among involved stakeholders
was the great concern for a number of interviewees:
“The lack of coordination among stakeholders was
phenomenal for implementing this (MSI Act) policy.
The former Budgeting and Planning (currently:
Vice-Presidency for Strategic Planning and Supervision
libraries) Organization began to implement the policy
without enough coordination with the Ministry of
Health [and Medical Education].”
(Health policy researcher).
The majority of interviewees pointed out the lack of
cultural preparation and awareness as important
factors that lowered stakeholders’ support for the pol-
icy. This was exacerbated by lack of legal support for
the policy, which affected its desired implementation
considerably:
“If the entire country’s system, including the
government and other state institutions abided by the
MSI Act, many anticipated changes would have been
definitely implemented during the set time period of
the implementation.” (Health policy maker).
Feasibility of the implementation
Many interviewees thought that conducting a feasibility
analysis, e.g., looking for research evidence and conducing
pilot studies to understand strengths and weaknesses of
the policy, was a crucial step that was neglected prior to
the implementation of hospitals’ autonomy policy. In
other words, the main criticism was not taking similar
experiences into account, as well as lack of engagement
with health experts and practitioners to design the policy.
A former senior health official commented:
“They [former Budgeting and planning organization]
should have ensured whether all prerequisites for
implementing the policy were in place or not, and
whether or not the policy could be completely
implemented nationwide? Prior to its universal
implementation, strengths and weaknesses, as well as
opportunities and threats of the policy implementation
must have been analyzed.”
Doshmangir et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2016) 16:138 Page 7 of 13
The implementation approach
Here, we describe our participants’ views towards the im-
plementation of hospital autonomy policy with regards to:
method, approach, and timing of the implementation.
Method of the implementation
Some interviewees stated that top-down implementa-
tion of hospital autonomy, i.e., by direct command of
the former Planning and Budgeting Organization, and
without engaging with street-level bureaucrats may
have led to stakeholders’ opposition and policy failure
eventually:
“The Government was the sole actor in the
implementation of this policy, while the Ministry of
Health was against it. No other organization was
taken into consideration for designing as well as
putting this policy into practice. The top-down ap-
proach may have hastened the policy implementation,
but it will not last for long time.” (National policy
maker).
One of the main challenges to the implementation of
policy was lack of full expansion of insurance coverage
nationwide, prior to putting hospital autonomy into
practice:
“We focused on economic aspect of hospitals first,
prior to attempting to expand insurance coverage
universally. We should have done exactly the opposite:
insuring people before creating autonomous hospitals”
(Former senior health policy maker).
“In the years following this plan, hospital autonomy
outpaced universal health insurance and caused
serious problems.” (Former minister of health).
The blanket approach (‘one size fits all’ approach)
The fee-for-service payment policy, which was endorsed
by the MSI Act and was entirely implemented in all public
hospitals across the country, aimed to increase the effi-
ciency of autonomous hospitals. The majority of inter-
viewees described this policy as the “blanket approach”,
meaning that regardless of regional differences in terms of
patient distribution and human resources, the MSI Act
covered all public hospitals across the country. No well-
developed plan existed about the distribution of diseases
across the country and in different hospitals. Lack of thor-
ough investigation and feasibility analysis before and
during the implementation as well as treating all hospitals
equally without categorizing them, led many hospitals face
serious problems. This resulted in many disadvantaged
regional hospitals to face many unwanted problems.
“If such a hospital was managed based on the fee
for service policy, how could it be compared to a
hospital in central areas of the province?”
(Former senior national policy maker).
Our findings showed that Fee-for-service payment
increased induced demand and moved hospitals towards
creating hospital wards that are more profitable and with
greater cost benefit:
“Fee-for-service payment in hospitals increased some
inappropriate behaviors of health providers as induced
demand and receiving under table payments”
(Senior Policy maker).
Various bed occupancy rates, and special services
provided by various hospitals, were two factors that
could affect hospital’s revenue:
“It is really meaningless for this policy to cover
mental hospitals, burn centers, and other chronic
diseases’ hospitals. Bed turnover is very low in such
hospitals. Consequently, this approach would lead
to low income and finally insolvency in such
hospitals.” (Former hospital manager).
To compensate insurance organizations’ failure in
proper and timely allocation of resources among hos-
pitals, it was decided to increase the authority of
medical universities for collecting revenues from the
insurance organizations, as well as allocating funds
and revenues towards hospitals. However, medical
universities did not have the right criteria for re-
source allocation, which gradually led to creation of a
bargaining atmosphere between hospitals and medical
universities to absorb more funds. Some interviewees
thought that this led to unfair budget allocations,
where some hospitals with the best performance were
given the lowest priority. This in turn encouraged
poor performance among hospitals:
“I argue that the university allocated the best
resources to the worst hospitals. In doing so, it
discouraged better performing hospitals.”
(Former hospital manager).
Timing of implementation
Particular characteristics of the health system and hasty
implementation led to the failure of hospital autonomy
policy in Iran:
“Hasty and unprofessional implementation of MSI Act
pushed many hospitals toward bankruptcy and closure.”
(Former senior national official).
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“Our argument is that if we want to implement
Medical Services Insurance Act, we should not
suddenly impose the costs of the hospitals on the
medical sciences universities, stopping the budget for
running costs and telling them to cover via your
revenues because the insurance is being implemented”
[September 1991, Parliament’s 3’rd period, Session400,
Gazette No:14788].
Let alone that much longer time was required for
appropriate implementation of a policy with such nature:
“The fact that we immediately implemented the
hospital autonomy policy after the approval of MSI
Act and anticipated a five-year period for complete
implementation of the latter was so naïve.” (Former
advisor to the minister of health).
Discussion
The Medical Services Insurance (MSI) Act was ap-
proved in 1994 and led to the establishment of Med-
ical Services Insurance Organizations (MSIO) in the
same year in Iran. The policy was an effort to imple-
ment hospitals’ autonomy and develop contracts, on
the basis of fee-for-service arrangements between the
MSIO and participating (public teaching) hospitals.
The newly funded insurance organization (MSIO) was
not an independent entity, and performed under the
authority of MOHME until 2004, when it moved
under the newly established ministry of Welfare and
Social Security (currently: Ministry of Cooperatives,
Labor and Social Affair). The underlying aim of MSI
Act was splitting purchaser (insurance agents) from
provider (MOHME) within the health system. We
explored the reasons for hasty, incomplete, and un-
successful implementation of MSI Act and its unex-
pected and sometimes adverse effects on the Iranian
health system.
We found serious limitations in the design (policy
content) and the conceptual framework of the policy,
important contextual issues (implementation context),
as well as its subsequent delivery and implementation
(implementation process). The hospital autonomy policy
was in essence a hospital financing policy. The policy did
not fully acknowledge the contextual issues that distorted
the effects of the financing recommendations, namely
policy contents, which were incorporated into the policy.
The fee-for-service payments and the medical tariffs struc-
ture increased hospital costs. The organizational limita-
tions of the insurance organizations, hospitals and the
medical universities resulted in their inabilities to monitor
providers’ behavior and limit the costs. In fact, the hospi-
tals and medical universities were incentivized to maintain
physicians’ revenue-maximizing behaviors. The policy
proponents also underestimated the strong oppositions of
several stakeholder groups, and failed to incorporate any
pilot or feasibility assessments to identify potential short-
comings. Such important shortcomings were augmented
with a definitive mandate that made it impossible to revert
a policy that was enshrined in the annual budget acts; and
a hasty, top-down and ‘one-size-fits-all’ implementation
approach. As a result, the policy makers did not find any
appropriate opportunity to correct the shortcomings.
Therefore, the policy implementation process was man-
aged through reactive decisions to resolve identified
problems.
Coincidence of policies: the policy window
The implementation of hospital autonomy illustrates the
importance of policies’ coincidence in pushing a complex
policy into a health system. The establishment of MSIO,
whose mandate was fulfilling universal coverage, acceler-
ated the process of policy ratification and made the imple-
mentation of PPS more feasible. PPS aimed to increase
efficiency and improve accountability in a publicly financed
health system of Iran. Fundamental challenges hampered
the policy implementation and impeded the achievement
of its aims. Although hospitals received money for staff ’s
salary and overhead expenses from insurance organization,
organizational deficits of health insurance system de-
creased hope and erode reliance on insurance organiza-
tions eventually.
In principle, both the price and the volume of services
in fee for service contracts, must be prospectively deter-
mined by the purchasers [21]. Our findings highlighted
that low experience of newly established insurance organi-
zations; delayed payments; inappropriate and unrealistic
medical tariffs [42] (existing conflict of interest in deter-
mining tariffs, lack of a sound accounting system in deter-
mining tariffs, and tariffs not being based on day to day
costs and revenues), plus the weak capacity of hospitals,
were serious challenges to the implementation of PPS
policy and hospitals’ performance in Iran. Such shortages
led to irrational relative value of health services, which in
turn resulted in increasing OOP payment, as well as the
spreading under table payments in order to run hospitals,
both of which were seriously unwanted by policy makers.
Policy makers’ view points and complexity of the health
system
According to system thinking principle, “everything is
connected to everything else”. [43] Implementing a reform
or changing a policy is extremely complex; hence predict-
ing the behavior of the health care system becomes diffi-
cult [4, 44].
Holistic approach to health system would enable policy
makers to identify the high leverage points in the policy
cycle to avoid policy resistance [45]. In formulating and
implementing a policy, a systematic perspective helps
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policy makers to make decisions that are consistent with
their long-term best interests and the long-term best
interests of the system as a whole [43]. The hospital
autonomy policy fulfilled only one dimension of PPS,
while neglecting other dimensions. The readiness of
purchasers and reducing information asymmetries
between providers (hospitals) and purchasers (insurance
bodies) are important prerequisites of a successful PPS
policy [46]. Hospital autonomy policy expected the
hospitals to act as economic units, while the policy
ignored the need for the development of effective
market regulations mechanisms.
In addition, the potential revenues of hospitals from
the insurers did not match the financial needs and
expectations of the teaching hospitals, as well as hospi-
tals located in small towns and cities. The policy did not
acknowledge different requirements of such hospitals
[47]. As a result, hospitals - and subsequently the minis-
try of health and medical education - started lobbying
the government and parliament to allocate other ‘public’
funds towards hospitals. Such practice was against the
primary intention of the policy makers. The hospitals
had no choice than funding themselves through other
directions and moved towards financing through out of
pocket payments by patients.
Hasty implementation of PPS policy and the limited
time period (less than a year) that was spent to develop
the purchasing processes, transforming the budget
system, and preparing the cultural change requirements
for both purchasers and providers, had some severe
adverse consequences for the policy implementation
[48]. Expecting the full implementation of the universal
health insurance in five years time was far from reality.
The MSIO failed to meet this target by 1999, as it still
remains unmet [49]. Implementing universal health
insurance is a gradual approach and requires meticulous
planning [50–53].
Policy triangle framework and hospital autonomy in Iran
Based on traditional stage heuristic framework for pol-
icy analysis, for any policy initiative to be effective, all
four components (context, content, players and process)
of policy must be taken into consideration [54, 55].
Understanding contextual opportunities, their complex-
ity and constraints to policy change such as situational,
structural, cultural and international or exogenous,
which are specific for setting and time, help policy
entrepreneurs and innovators move toward policy objec-
tives [56, 57]. Our findings illustrated that none of
these components were appropriately prepared for the
implementation of fee for service policy in teaching
hospitals in Iran. The creation of MSIO was an attempt
to curb some of the main health system problems, i.e.,
improving efficiency, responding to patients’ expectations,
making money following the patients, and improving
access to medical care and public hospitals’ accountability.
Our findings suggest that none of these goals were
achieved as a result of the hospital autonomy policy in
Iran. Implementing MSIO through PPS policy not only
did not led to development of universal health coverage in
Iran, but it actually brought people’s hope down for
receiving high quality healthcare in public hospitals.
Policy development is a process, which happens over
time and requires both intra- and inter-organizational
coordination [58]. The role of actors (players), their
underlying interests and the level of their commitments
toward the desired policy or specific issue, and also
understanding their perceptions and values is another
important factor in developing and implementing a pol-
icy [11, 59, 60]. Government, as one of influential actors,
did not take its full role in implementing hospital auton-
omy policy in Iran. The government took an important
role in developing the policy, but it did not fully
materialize its duty to fund the implementation of policy
and support the insurance organizations.
Evidence shows managerial problems in hospitals and
insurance organizations somewhat weigh in a balance
with the positive effects and outcomes accruing to them
[61]. Our findings implied the lack of training provided
to both the new breed of hospital managers and insurers
to undertake radically different roles within the Iranian
healthcare system as another challenge in fully and
successful development of the PPS policy. Obviously, it
is unrealistic to expect health professionals to become
expert managers over a night, and without adequate
training about the new context and requirements of
their new role.
Limitations of this study
The retrospective nature of this policy study caused
difficulties for interviewees in recalling the policy
events, the trends and their causes and effects. The
main documents of the study belonged to about two
to three decades ago. There was no existing and com-
prehensive collection of relevant policy documents.
We identified the collected documents via searching
relevant libraries and following the leads that we
found in both the documents and the interviews.
Despite the efforts, we cannot claim that all the rele-
vant documents have been covered in this study.
Conclusions
In this paper, we reported a retrospective analysis to
understand strengths and weaknesses of development
and implementation of teaching hospitals’ autonomy
in Iran. The MSI Act and establishment of MSIO,
which aimed at hospitals’ autonomy and purchaser-
provider split, were appropriately formulated policies.
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However, the implementation of those policies was prob-
lematic and ended up in some adverse consequences such
as higher out of pocket expenditure. The policy led hospi-
tals to behave as a profit-maximizing firm. Our evidence
leads us to recommend gradual, cautious, and well-
planned shift to a contract-based relationship within a
hospital autonomy policy implementation, if at all. Any
attempts to increase hospital’s revenue through dropping
fee for service arrangements may lead to unwanted conse-
quences for quality of health services, education purposes
(in teaching hospitals) and eroding public trust in the
health care system. Hence, careful consideration and
appropriate preparation are required prior to implement-
ing such reforms in any hospital setting. Monitoring the
implementation process, identifying the challenges, and
addressing shortcoming at the right time, are crucial
prerequisites of successful implementation of hospital
autonomy.
Availability of data and materials
The datasets supporting the conclusions of this article
are included within the article.
Consent to participate and consent to publish
Oral consent to participate, record and publish the
data collected from the participants was obtained at
each interview by the interviewer. As also described
in the Methods section, it was culturally inappropriate
to request written consent given the participants’ high
official governmental ranks.
Endnotes
1http://www.maxqda.com/products/maxqda10
Appendix
Interview guide
Date and venue:
Name and position of interviewee
1. Please explain your general perception of the hos-
pital board of trustees’ policy (approved 2004) in Iran.
2. What were the aims and objectives of the policy?
Why this policy was formulated and implemented?
3. How the policy entered to the policy agenda? By
whom (individuals, groups or organizations)? How the
policy was formulated and implemented? Which groups
or organizations were opponents or proponents of the
policy?
4. What is your opinion about implementation of the
hospital board of trustees’ policy in the following of hos-
pital autonomy policy?
5. Which financing policies were adopted in accord-
ance with the policy?
6. To what extent do you think the policy was properly
implemented and the aims were achieved?
7. Please, explain the strengths and weaknesses of the
policy. Which aspects of the policy need to be changed
or improved?
8. To what extent do you think the policy was clear (in
the content, objectives, expected results and outcomes)?
9. Regarding the policy, to what extent do you think
Iranian public hospitals and health system have had the
capacity for proper implementation of the policy? Which
essentials should have been considered before the imple-
mentation of the policy?
10. In what extent do you think implementation of the
policy was based on evidence (local or global)?
11. What were the effects of the policy (positive and
negative) on hospitals, health system and community?
12. From your point of view, why teaching hospitals
were selected for the implementation of the policy.
13. Considering the fact that several years have passed
since the implementation of the policy, what are the
main problems of policy implementation in hospitals?
14. What are the effects of the policy on financing of
teaching hospitals? What were the main reasons of
changing financing method of the hospitals?
15. So far, have you received any feedback from policy-
makers and stakeholders such as insurance organiza-
tions, medical council organization, medical tariff office
and people regarding the implementation of the policy?
Please discuss. How did you deal with these feedbacks?
16. Do you have any evidence to show the extent by
which the policy has been accepted by the stakeholders?
17. Would you please, give your opinion about, whether
the policy was successful or not? If your answer is no,
explain why it has not been ended?
18. As a final question, is there any further issue you
would like to add?
Note: The questions were adjusted based on each
interviewee’s position in health system.
With special thanks for your invaluable contribution.
Focus Group Discussion Guide
1. To what extent do you think the hospital board of
trustees’ policy was properly implemented in hospitals
and the aims were achieved? Do you have any evidence?
Please explain more.
2. To what extent do you think the policy was based
on knowledge of “what works”? Please explain.
3. In your opinion, to what extent do you think the
financing mechanism of the policy has been interpreted
comprehensively and objectives, functions and conse-
quences were clear?
4. To what extent do you think our health system have
had capacity for implementing the policy? Before imple-
mentation of the policy what actions and activities
should be implemented in hospitals?
5. Do you think implementation of the policy was
based on evidence (local and global)? Please explain.
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6. Please explain regarding positive and negative effects
of the policy in teaching hospitals?
7. To what extent do you think proper and complete
implementation of the policy will be effective in dealing
with the current challenges of the hospitals and the
health system?
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
LD conceived the study, participated in data collection and data analysis, as
well as preparation of the manuscript. AR contributed to the development of
data collection, carried out data analysis, and contributed to the writing and
editing of the manuscript. MJ carried out part of data collection and data
analysis, and contributed to the writing of the manuscript. HR participated in
the design and organization of study and contributed to the writing of the
manuscript. AT participated in the study design, writing and several editing
of the manuscript, and is guarantor. All authors read and approved the final
manuscript.
Acknowledgements
This study was part of a PhD thesis supported by Iran University of Medical
Sciences, Tehran-Iran. We are grateful to those interviewed. We would like to
express our very great appreciation to Dr Hassan Aminloo, Dr Mohammad
Reza Vaez Mahdavi, Dr Hossein Salarianzadeh, and Dr Abbas Fazaeli for their
valuable and constructive suggestions during the planning and development
of this research.
Author details
1Iranian Center of Excellence in Health Management, School of Health
Services Management, Tabriz University of Medical Sciences, Tabriz, Iran.
2Tabriz Health Management Research Center (NPMC), Tabriz University of
Medical sciences, Tabriz, Iran. 3Department of Health Management and
Economics, School of Public Health, Tehran University of Medical Sciences,
Tehran, Iran. 4Knowledge Utilization Research Center, Tehran University of
Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran. 5School of Health Management and
information Sciences, Iran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran.
6Health Management and Economics Sciences Research Center, Iran
University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran. 7Department of Global Health &
Public Policy, School of Public Health, Tehran University of Medical Sciences,
Tehran, Iran. 8College of Health & Life Sciences, Brunel University London,
Uxbridge, UK.
Received: 25 March 2014 Accepted: 18 April 2016
References
1. Crinson I. Health Policy: A Critical Perspective. Newcastle upon Tyne:
Sage; 2008.
2. Lane J-E. The Public Sector: Concepts, Models and Approaches. Newcastle
upon Tyne: Sage; 2000.
3. Mazmanian DA, Sabatier PA. Effective Policy Implementation. Houston:
Free Press; 1981.
4. Blas E. The proof of the reform is in the implementation. Int J Health Plann
Manage. 2004;19 Suppl 1:S3–23.
5. Mills A, Colclough C. Improving the efficiency of public sector health
services in developing countries: bureaucratic versus market approaches.
Marketizing education and health in developing countries:
Miracle or mirage. 1997:245–74.
6. Saltman R, Bankauskaite V, Vrangbaek K. Decentralization in health care:
McGraw-Hill International; 2007.
7. Allen P. New localism in the English National Health Service: what is it for?
Health Policy. 2006;79(2–3):244–52.
8. Exworthy M, Frosini F. Room for manoeuvre? Explaining local autonomy in
the English National Health Service. Health Policy. 2008;86(2–3):204–12.
9. Siverbo S. The purchaser-provider split in principle and practice: experiences
from Sweden. Financial Accountability Management. 2004;20(4):401–20.
10. Gallego R. Introducing purchaser/provider separation in the Catalan health
administration: a budget analysis. Public Adm. 2000;78(2):423–42.
11. Buse K, Mays N, Walt G. Making Health Policy (Understanding Public Health).
UK: Bell & Brain Ltd.; 2005.
12. Stewart J. Research note: purchaser-provider – Are the purchasers ready for
It? Australian J Public Administration. 1999;58(4):105–9.
13. Saltman R, Bankauskaite V, Vrangbaek K. Decentralization in health care.
New York City: Open University Press; 2006.
14. Lapsley I. The NPM, agenda: back to the future. Financial Accountability
Management. 2008;24(1):77–96.
15. McPake B, Yepes FJ, Lake S, Sanchez LH. Is the Colombian health system
reform improving the performance of public hospitals in Bogota? Health
Policy and Planning. 2003;18(2):182–94.
16. Shackley P, Healey A. Creating a market: an economic analysis of the
purchaser-provider model. Health Policy. 1993;25(1–2):153–68.
17. Tynkkynen LK, Keskimaki I, Lehto J. Purchaser-provider splits in health care-
The case of Finland. Health Policy. 2013;111(3):221–5.
18. Pettersen IJ. Accountable management reforms: why the Norwegian
hospital reform experiment got lost in implementation. Financial
Accountability Management. 1999;15(3–4):377–96.
19. Hood S. The purchaser/provider separation in child and family social work:
Implications for service delivery and for the role of the social worker.
Child & Family Social Work. 1997;2(1):25–35.
20. Fischbacher M, Francis A. Purchaser provider relationships and innovation: a
case study of GP purchasing in Glasgow. Financial Accountability &
Management. 1998;14(4):281–98.
21. Street A. Purchaser/provider separation and managed competition: reform
options for Australia’s health system. Aust J Public Health. 1994;18(4):369–79.
22. Abbott S, Procter S, Iacovou N. NHS purchaser–provider relationships in
England and Wales: the view from primary care. Social Policy &
Administration. 2009;43(1):1–14.
23. Ormsby MJ. The provider/purchaser split: a report from New Zealand.
Governance. 1998;11(3):357–87.
24. Takian A, Rashidian A, Doshmangir L. The experience of purchaser–provider
split in the implementation of family physician and rural health insurance in
Iran: an institutional approach. Health Policy and Planning, 2014;1–11
doi:10.1093/heapol/czu135
25. Baxter K. A Response to the Research Note: ‘Purchaser-Provider – are the
Purchasers Ready for It?’. Australian J Public Administration.
1999;58(4):110–1.
26. Preker AS, Harding A. Innovations in health service delivery: the
corporatization of public hospitals: World Bank; 2002.
27. Lapsley I. Accounting and the new public management: instruments of
substantive efficiency or a rationalising modernity? Financial Accountability
Management. 1999;15(3–4):201–7.
28. Ahgren B. Competition and integration in Swedish health care. Health
Policy. 2010;96(2):91–7.
29. Iran Parliament research Center. Comparative study of the health care
systems in the current world Research Deputy. Iran: Parliment
Research center; 1994.
30. Davari M, Haycox A, Walley T. The Iranian health insurance system; past
experiences, present challenges and future strategies. Iran J Public Health.
2012;41(9):1–9.
31. Doshmangir L, Rashidian A, Ravaghi H, Takian AH, Jafari M. The experience
of implementing the board of trustees’ policy in teaching hospitals in Iran:
an example of health system decentralization. Int J Health Policy Manag.
2014;3(x):1–10. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2014.115.
32. Hoshyar J. implementation Capability of Universal Medical services
Insurance and economic administartion of medical centres Tehran, Iran.:
Planing and Budget Orgaization 1993.[In Farsi]
33. Jafari M, Rashidian A, Abolhasani F, Mohammad K, Yazdani S, Parkerton P, et
al. Space or no space for managing public
hospitals; a qualitative study of hospital autonomy in Iran. Int J Health
Plann Manage. 2011;26(3):e121–37.
34. Who. IRAN National Health Accounts. 2011. Available from:
URL: http://www.who.int/nha/docs/en/Iran_NHA_report_english.pdf.
Accessed 16 March 2013.
35. Takian A, Rashidian A, Kabir MJ. Expediency and coincidence in
re-engineering a health system: an interpretive approach to formation of
family medicine in Iran. Health Policy Plan. 2011;26(2):163–73.
36. Takian A, Doshmangir L, Rashidian A. Implementing family physician
programme in rural Iran: exploring the role of an existing primary health
care network. Fam Pract. 2013;20.
Doshmangir et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2016) 16:138 Page 12 of 13
37. Mehrdad R. Health system in Iran. JMAJ. 2009;52(1):69–73.
38. Fars News agency. Coverage of 36 milion of Iran population by medical
services insurance, 11, 2013 [June, 12, 2013]; Available from: http://www.
farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910922001006. Accessed 16 March 2013.
39. Pope C, Mays N. Qualitative research in health care: Wiley. com; 2008.
40. Krippendorff K. Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology.
Sage; 2012.
41. Rashidian A, Eccles MP, Russell I. Falling on stony ground? A qualitative
study of implementation of clinical guidelines’ prescribing
recommendations in primary care. Health Policy. 2008;85(2):148–61.
42. Doshmangir L, Rashidian A, Moaeiri F, Akbari Salari A.Effect of Proposed
Changes of Relative Values of Different Specialists Medical Tariffs on
Payment Weight to Specialties and Health System Costs. Hakim. 2011;14(1):
1-9 URL http://hakim.hbi.ir/browse.php?a_code=A-10-1-393&slc_
lang=fa&sid=1 [In Farsi]. Accesed 16 March 2013.
43. Sterman J. Business dynamics. New York City: Irwin-McGraw-Hill; 2000.
44. Agyepong IA, Kodua A, Adjei S, Adam T. When ‘solutions of yesterday
become problems of today’: crisis-ridden decision making in a complex
adaptive system (CAS)–the Additional Duty Hours Allowance in Ghana.
Health Policy Plan. 2012;27 Suppl 4:iv20–31.
45. Sterman JD. Learning from evidence in a complex world. Am J Public
Health. 2006;96(3):505–14.
46. Castano R, Mills A. The consequences of hospital autonomization in
Colombia: a transaction cost economics analysis. Health Policy Plan.
2013;28(2):157–64.
47. Ssengooba F, Atuyambe L, McPake B, Hanson K, Okuonzi S. What could be
achieved with greater public hospital autonomy? Comparison of public and
PNFP hospitals in Uganda. Public Adm Dev. 2002;22(5):415–28.
48. Lewis J, Bernstock P, Bovell V, Wookey F. The purchaser/provider split in
social care: is it working? Soc Policy Adm. 1996;30(1):1–19.
49. Rashidian AKA, Khabiri R, Khodayari-Moez E, Elahi E, Arab M, Radaie Z.
Islamic Republic of Iran’s Multiple Indicator Demographic and Health Survey
(IrMIDHS) 2000. Tehran: Ministry of Health and Medical Education; 2012.
50. Bärnighausen T, Sauerborn R. One hundred and eighteen years of the
German health insurance system: are there any lessons for middle-and
low-income countries? Soc Sci Med. 2002;54(10):1559–87.
51. Carrin G, James C. Social health insurance: key factors affecting the
transition towards universal coverage. Int Soc Secur Rev. 2005;58(1):45–64.
52. Carrin G, Mathauer I, Xu K, Evans DB. Universal coverage of health services:
tailoring its implementation. Bull World Health Organ. 2008;86(11):857–63.
53. Evans T, Chowdhury M, Evans D, Fidler A, Lindelow M, Mills A, et al.
Thailand’s Universal Coverage Scheme: Achievements and Challenges. An
independent assessment of the first 10 years (2001–2010) Synthesis Report.
Thailand: Health Systems Research Institute; 2012.
54. Buse K, Mays N, Walt G. Making health policy. New York City: McGraw-Hill
International; 2012.
55. Buse K. Addressing the theoretical, practical and ethical challenges inherent
in prospective health policy analysis. Health Policy Plan. 2008;23(5):351–60.
56. Leichter HM. A comparative approach to policy analysis: health care policy
in four nations. CUP Archive; 1979.
57. Moran M, Rein M, Goodin RE. The Oxford handbook of public policy. Oxford
Handbooks Online; 2008.
58. Hill MJ, Hupe PL. Implementing public policy: governance in theory and
practice. Wiley Online Library; 2002.
59. Hermans LM, Cunningham SW. Actor Models for Policy Analysis. Public
Policy Analysis: Springer; 2013. p. 185–213.
60. Roberts M, Hsiao W, Berman P, Reich M. Getting health reform right: a guide to
improving performance and equity. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2003.
61. Atinga RA, Mensah SA, Asenso-Boadi F, Adjei F-XA. Migrating from user fees
to social health insurance: exploring the prospects and challenges for
hospital management. BMC Health Serv Res. 2012;12(1):174. •  We accept pre-submission inquiries 
•  Our selector tool helps you to find the most relevant journal
•  We provide round the clock customer support 
•  Convenient online submission
•  Thorough peer review
•  Inclusion in PubMed and all major indexing services 
•  Maximum visibility for your research
Submit your manuscript at
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central 
and we will help you at every step:
Doshmangir et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2016) 16:138 Page 13 of 13
